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Iain R. Smith (Warwick) and Andreas Stucki (Berne)
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‘The colonial development of concentration camps (1868-1902)’ 
 
The forced labour and extermination camps established in Europe during the 
Second World War gave the meaning to the term ‘concentration camp’ which it 
has for the general public today.  But the practice of concentrating civilians in 
guarded camps or centres, specifically as part of a counter-guerrilla military 
strategy during wartime, long pre-dated and outlasted the Second World War. In 
the light of fresh research this article looks comparatively at the function of the 
camps in four different colonial arenas between 1868 and 1908. It emphasizes the 
different purposes between these exercises in civilian concentration and the 
‘camp culture’ of the Nazi era in Europe and challenges the linkage between the 
two asserted by Hannah Arendt half a century ago and by many others since.  
  
It has long been argued that the origins of concentration camps lie in the 
colonial arenas of imperial powers at the turn of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries.
2
 It 
was in the context of the British camps in South Africa (1900-1902) that the term 
‘concentration camp’ was first put into general currency in English – as Goering 
pointed out to the British ambassador to Berlin in 1938.
3
 But the phenomenon has 
usually been traced back to the Spanish-Cuban War of 1895-1898. Reference to 
(re)concentrados, however, occurred earlier in Cuba, during the Ten Years’ War 
(1868-1878) and the Guerra chiquita (1879-1880), though the term ‘concentration 
camp’ is rarely found in the Cuban case, where civilians were concentrated in 
towns and villages under surveillance  by Spanish regulars and irregulars. The 
internment of civilians in guarded camps, under conditions which regularly 
resulted in high mortality, was also a feature of strife-torn Europe long before the 
Second World War.
4
 Yet it is the forced labour and extermination camps in 
Europe, between 1939 and 1945, which gave the common meaning to the term 
‘concentration camp’ which it has today.5 Since in South Africa and Cuba the 
later Nazi associations of the term ‘concentration camp’ have been deliberately 
exploited, it is important to acknowledge distinctions when the same term is used 
2 
to describe widely differing phenomena in different contexts and eras. Historians 
tend to look for continuities, links and precedents and historians of modern 
Germany have had particular reasons for doing so. There is now a sizeable 
literature, in the German case, linking what took place in colonial contexts in 
Africa, between 1904 and 1908, and what occurred later in Europe.
6
The camps 
established by the German military in South West Africa, during the suppression 
of the rebellion by the Herero and Nama (1904-1908), were not essentially part of 
an anti-guerrilla strategy but were rather ‘punishment’ and ‘pacification’ camps 
for an enemy who had already been defeated. They are therefore functionally 
different from the three cases considered here.
7
  
In this article, we focus on the establishment of concentration camps in 
colonial contexts as part of a military strategy against guerrilla warfare during 
colonial rebellions and we would argue that this differs, in fundamental respects, 
from the camps established in Europe by e.g. Italy, Germany and the Soviet 
Union before and during the Second World War as part of wider systems of terror 
and political repression.  In the colonial  context, in the camps established by the 
Spanish in Cuba, the British in South Africa and  the Americans in the Philippines  
there was never any  intention of  the physical extermination of those interned in 
them.  In this article  we  show  that the  main purpose of civilian concentration 
lay in ‘clearing’ the countryside of possible civilian support  for an evasive enemy 
who had resorted to guerrilla warfare.
8
 Whilst our focus is on the two cases where 
we have done fresh research – the Spanish concentrados in Cuba (1895-1898) and 
the British camps in South Africa (1900-1902) – we also try, in the limited space 
of an article, to bring the American camps in the Philippines (1899-1902) into 
comparative view. 
3 
Civilians in  colonial  warfare: 
The resort to ‘civilian concentration’ by colonial powers struggling to 
contain rebellions in situations of guerrilla warfare, illuminates the fragility of 
colonial regimes which often found it difficult to occupy effectively the territory 
over which they claimed sovereignty during the ‘high noon’ of imperialism. There 
were many further colonial contexts in which this forced concentration of 
civilians was to occur, as a military measure sometimes accompanied by enforced 
‘modernization’, during the course of the 20th century and especially during the 
armed struggles which accompanied the process of decolonisation after 1945.
9
 In 
the period under discussion (1868-1902) the Spanish in Cuba, the British in South 
Africa, and the Americans in the Philippines were compelled to involve far more 
troops than had originally been envisaged in protracted conflicts with usually 
smaller numbers of guerrilla fighters. The rebellions in Cuba and the Philippines 
resulted in external (American) intervention and the end of Spanish colonial rule.  
In South Africa, the terms of the peace agreed with the Boers by the Treaty of 
Vereeniging in May 1902, replaced the earlier British insistence on ‘unconditional 
surrender’ in order to bring the war to an end. 
In all these cases, a blurring of the distinction between combatants and 
non-combatant civilians occurred, as is usually the case when there is a resort to 
guerrilla warfare. In these cases civilian concentration has to be regarded as 
essentially a military measure, the purpose of which was to separate the guerrilla 
fighters from any support from the civilian population amongst whom they could 
merge so easily. As a counter-guerrilla strategy this has a long history and a clear 
military rationale, even if, in our cases, humanitarian claims were also made in 
terms of enabling these civilians or refugees to be concentrated in places where – 
amidst an accompanying ‘scorched earth’ policy – they allegedly could be 
4 
accommodated and fed. Preoccupied with fighting the war, the organization and 
administration of civilian concentration camps was never a priority for the 
military authorities. It takes a strong, developed, adequately funded administration 
to organize and run a concentration camps system – the contrast between the 
British and Spanish cases is most striking here – and the presence of a civilian 
government capable of taking over this task was, in the South African case, 
critical to reducing the mortality rate and improving the conditions within the 
camps. In all these cases, the ability of the metropolitan government to intervene, 
check and control the military authorities in time of war was of crucial 
importance, as was the role of public opinion in exercising its influence on the 
metropolitan government and compelling it to intervene in ways which it might 
otherwise not have done. 
Both political and military decision makers were influenced by 
contemporary racial ideology and its accompanying Social Darwinist ideas and by 
the concept of a ‘civilising mission’ which was a recurrent feature of European 
colonial involvement with the non-European world at this time. For all the 
European colonial powers, fighting an enemy categorised as ‘uncivilised’ lowered 
the barrier against the resort to more extreme measures of warfare. The Spanish 
regarded the Cuban rebels – consisting predominantly of Afro-Cubans – as 
‘savages’ beyond the pale of civilisation. In South Africa, the black population 
was not the enemy. Tens of thousands of native Africans were employed by the 
British army and many looked to a British victory to improve their lot. In areas 
under temporary Boer control, some paid with their lives for their British 
loyalty.
10
 Meanwhile Kitchener, exasperated by the failure of the Middelburg 
peace negotiations in early 1901, described the Boers as ‘uncivilized Africander 
savages with only a thin white veneer’ and proposed ‘getting rid of’ those still 
5 
fighting and their families by deporting them to Fiji or getting the French or 
Dutch to take them in Madagascar or Java.
11
 In the Philippines, the paternalist 
gloss given to the American take-over there by President McKinley was 
accompanied, after his re-election in November 1900, by the declaration of 
martial law and authorisation, by the Secretary of State for War, for use of the 
tough ‘methods which have proved successful in our Indian campaigns in the 
West’. US Officers regarded  Filipinos as ‘by no means civilized’ and in 
‘identically the same position as the Indians of our country have been for many 
years’. Therefore, in their opinion, the Filipino insurgency ‘must be subdued in 
much the same way’.12 
CUBA (1868-1898): 
Spanish colonial rule in Cuba had been repeatedly threatened during the 
second half of the 19
th
 century. Frustrated political and organizational reforms for 
the once ‘ever faithful island’ led, in October 1868, to a general uprising in 
eastern Cuba. Rebellions usually began in the poorer, less developed and more 
turbulent Oriente. In 1868, property-owners there ‘freed’ their slaves – to 
encourage them to join the rebellion – and fought together with the cattle farmers 
from Puerto Príncipe against Spanish rule. The Spanish army and voluntary-units 
managed to keep the insurgency more or less out of the rich, western provinces. 
Heavily dependent on slave labour, western planters feared not only economic 
loss but also that this revolt against Spanish rule would result in social revolution 
and a ‘race war’. Panic at the prospect of a ‘second Haiti’ was eagerly nurtured by 
Spanish propaganda. However, while inhabitants in the east suffered from ruthless 
guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare, the destruction of livestock, expropriation, 
and forced resettlement – until the peace settlement of February 1878 – in western 
Cuba sugar production increased.
13
 
6 
During the Ten Years’ War a lively discussion had developed about how 
to deal with the insurrection in general and on concentration-policies in particular 
– even beyond military circles. Most of the operational plans (many published in 
the early 1870s) had in common prompt pacification, closely connected with the 
intense concentration of the rural population along military communication lines. 
In 1872, the medical officer Echauz y Guinart, for example, recommended a 
master plan which included the forced resettlement and ‘clearing’ of half the 
island. Although continuous changes in the high command in Havana and 
political transformations in Madrid prevented a unified and concerted military 
strategy, tens of thousands of deportees had merged with refugees in crowded 
cities like Puerto Príncipe and Ciego de Ávila, along the fortified military line 
between Júcaro and Morón. Mortality soared and internees begged for 
authorization to leave the points of reconcentration that lacked potable water and 
to escape disease. In eastern Cuba, this early experience of regrouping the rural 
population in wartime left deep memories.
14
 
In the following years of peace, Spain proved unable to tackle her ‘last 
chance in Cuba’. When new uprisings occurred, in February 1895, these benefited 
from a broader social base and a party-system which was well organized, both on 
the island and from exile: the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (PRC) headed by 
José Martí. Socio-political preconditions seemed to favour not only an anti-
colonial uprising but also a social revolution. Furthermore, Cuban exiles provided 
the Liberation Army: Ejército Libertador Cubano (ELC) with much needed 
supplies from the Florida Keys and other Caribbean islands. Charismatic veterans 
from the Ten Years’ War (Antonio Maceo, Máximo Gómez, Calixto García) 
returned to Cuba. Superiority in numbers, equipment, and funding seemed to give 
a big advantage to the Spanish army. But the ELC balanced some of these 
7 
asymmetries with greater mobility, better knowledge of the terrain and adaptation 
to the island’s climate together with widespread civilian support in Oriente. 
Spanish military power proved literally helpless in the face of tropical diseases: 
Of 44,389 fatalities during the war of 1895-98 only 3,996 died in combat; over 
40,000 (of the more than 200,000 Spanish forces in Cuba) died from disease; 
yellow fever being the biggest single killer of the Spanish troops.
15
 Spanish 
military performance therefore depended on the support given by Cuban and 
Spanish-born irregulars whose anti-guerrilla units accompanied regular troops as 
flying columns and operated as local anti-guerrilla forces around towns and cities. 
With up to 60-80,000 such irregulars on Spain’s payroll (as volunteers, town 
militias, fire units) they clearly outnumbered the ELC, which never recruited 
much more than 40,000 men. But this high number of irregulars should not be 
mistaken for widespread support for Spain. Only a minority took part in actual 
fighting and joining the local anti-guerrilla units or working on Spanish 
fortifications were amongst the few ways to earn a living during wartime and get 
the family on the official rations list. Nevertheless, Cubans fighting in Spanish 
lines are an important indication of the degree of civil strife involved in this war, 
an aspect which has often been ignored in the nationalist historiography.
16
 
By January 1896, Spanish Captain-General Arsenio Martínez Campos had 
suffered serious set-backs and the ELC had managed to penetrate the rich sugar-
districts of Santa Clara, Matanzas and Havana. The ELC developed a policy of 
economic warfare involving the deliberate destruction of crops and sugar mills, 
and attacks on towns and villages, the purpose being to make Cuba economically 
unrewarding to Spain. This triggered a massive refugee displacement and 
migration in the western provinces. Some Spanish historians have interpreted this 
movement as a first concentration of country folk in fortified centres. Historian 
8 
W. Millis argued that the ELC’s ‘scorched earth’ policy and ‘deconcentration’ – 
forcing farmers either to work in the ‘liberated territory’ or to move to the cities – 
began the radicalization of warfare which has usually been associated with 
Captain-General Valeriano Weyler. This view – that it was the insurgents who 
initiated ‘civilian concentration’ – has been strongly denied by P.S. Foner and 
Cuban scholars.
17
  
Amidst this controversy, there is no doubt that the plight of civilians came 
low on the list of imperial Spain’s priorities. Facing the impending collapse of 
Spanish rule in Cuba, powerful pressure groups on the island and large parts of 
the metropolitan press demanded a tougher war effort. Unsurprisingly, in January 
1896, Spain’s liberal-conservative government, under Antonio Cánovas del 
Castillo, decided upon the intensification and radicalization of warfare, sending 
General Weyler to Cuba. Already in 1891, Cánovas had told Congress that, in a 
future war in Cuba, those ‘who were willing to shed more rivers of blood’ would 
win.
18
 With the outbreak of the war in 1895, a broad consensus had developed – 
between Spanish liberals and conservatives – that the island of Cuba, ‘the pearl of 
the Antilles’, should be defended to the ‘last man and the last peso’.19 Cuba was 
considered as a matter of ‘national integrity’, especially amongst politicians and 
the armed forces. There was a long-standing fear that losing control of Cuba 
would lead to the breakdown of the metropolitan Restoration-government of 1874 
and of Spain’s artificially implemented two-party system which had  lasted since 
1885. 
Weyler was regarded as the man to do a ‘dirty job’. He was widely 
experienced in colonial anti-guerrilla warfare (Santo Domingo, Cuba, Philippines) 
and ready to ‘defend Spain’s honour in Cuba’. As anticipated, one of his first 
9 
decrees, in February 1896, ordered the concentration of the rural population of the 
eastern part of the island in Spanish held, fortified towns. In October 1896 and 
January 1897, the decree was extended to both the island’s western and the central 
provinces. With this measure – in combination with a ‘scorched earth’ strategy – 
civilian support for the insurgents was to be prevented. No intelligence, weapons, 
ammunition, clothing, medicine or new recruits should reach the Cuban guerrilla 
forces. Civilian concentration was an important part of Spain’s response to the 
insurgents’ irregular warfare. The physical separation of rebels and civilians 
seemed the only way to defeat an agile and often invisible opponent. In contrast to 
the U.S. policy of counter-insurgency in the Philippines, however, there was 
hardly any ‘offer of development’ in Cuba to win the civilians’ ‘hearts and 
minds’. On the contrary, many local civil governments were simply overwhelmed 
by the arrival of tens of thousands of concentrados. Meanwhile, Weyler was 
preoccupied with fighting the guerrillas and was reluctant to devote resources or 
organise rations for the destitute civilians. Many of the military regarded refugees 
and concentrados as disguised insurgents or sympathizers of the ‘Republic in 
Arms’. The local town elites considered concentrados as bearers of potential 
epidemics and diseases like smallpox as well as unwanted additional mouths to 
feed.
20
 Neglect contributed to the high mortality amongst the concentrados caused 
by inadequate housing and sanitary conditions, food shortages and subsequent 
epidemics. The ELC also contributed to this civilian catastrophe by blockading 
cities and towns from much needed supplies and by raids on so called ‘cultivation 
zones’. After a few weeks on rations, concentrados were expected to grow their 
own food for subsistence. The concentration policy in Cuba during 1896-97 was 
‘unprecedented at the time for its scale, intensity, and efficiency’. Recent research 
concludes that at least 170,000 civilian internees, about one tenth of the total 
10 
population, lost their lives in these concentration-centres.
21
 The forced 
resettlement in towns and cities had a lasting social impact on the island. Families 
were torn apart, women and girls forced into prostitution. The balance between 
the urban and rural populations altered substantially.  
Contemporaries estimated that during the war some 400,000-600,000 
people were assembled in over 80 concentration-points, located predominantly in 
the western part of the island. Some villages accommodated only a small number 
of concentrados, but in cities like Artemisa (Pinar del Río), with a normal 
population of about 2,000 inhabitants, civilian internees amounted to 6,364 by the 
end of November 1897; among them 3,244 children and 1,239 women. High 
numbers of concentrados and escalating mortality were reported from Matanzas 
and Santa Clara. Numbers given by provincial civil governors between November 
1897 and February 1898, although incomplete, enable us to reach an 
approximation for the total civilian deaths during the Cuban war of independence: 
Data shows that in Pinar del Río 50% of 47,800 concentrados died; of the 88,000 
internees in Matanzas 25,977. Santa Clara province reported 140,000 
concentrated civilians and 52,997 deaths, whereas there are no exact figures for 
Havana, Puerto Príncipe and Santiago. The figures given above therefore 
represent only single ‘snapshots’ at a particular time. Data from Santiago, 
Matanzas, and Santa Clara, for example, show that civilian concentration was not 
a static phenomenon. For these provinces we can detect important migration 
movements in and out of the main cities, sometimes over a few weeks. The 
number of concentrados was not only closely related to specific military actions. 
Even the announcement of forthcoming military operations was followed in 
Puerto Príncipe by a civilian influx into fortified towns. But people also left 
Trinidad (Santa Clara) in the spring of 1897, violating Weyler’s orders, in order to 
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flee from a smallpox epidemic. At Jovellanos (Matanzas) we know that many 
people left the town to work in the countryside during the months of the sugar 
harvest. In Matanzas province, a large exodus occurred when concentration was 
eased in November 1897 by the new decrees of Captain-General Ramón Blanco, 
who had replaced Weyler in October 1897.
22
 
In strictly military terms, Weyler’s concentration-policy achieved 
considerable success. By autumn 1897, the ELC was mainly confined to Cuba’s 
eastern provinces. In addition, General Camilo García Polavieja – who had 
replaced General Blanco in the Philippines in December 1896 – asked Madrid 
whether he might resort to similar strategies as Weyler to subdue the Katipuna’s 
uprising after resistance to Spanish rule had broken out on Luzon in August 1896. 
But the Pact of Biak-na-bato, which brought the uprising to an end in mid-
December 1897, was more the result of divisions in the Filipino revolutionary 
front than of successful Spanish anti-guerrilla strategies. In Cuba, however, 
Weyler’s methods of extreme warfare, regardless of civilian losses, made him 
unacceptable to the newly constituted liberal government in Spain. In the U.S.A., 
the massive number of civilian deaths which occurred under Weyler’s regime was 
regarded as a demonstration of Spain’s ‘uncivilized warfare’, and formed a major 
justification for the U.S. Army’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ in April 1898. The 
fragility of Spanish imperial rule was clearly revealed when Spain was seriously 
challenged by the combination of liberation movements in Cuba and the 
Philippines with the readiness of the U.S.A., as the emerging world power, to 
intervene and bring about the end of the Spanish Empire in both the Caribbean 
and the Pacific. 
PHILIPPINES (1899-1902): 
12 
After the American take-over of the Philippines in December 1898, war 
broke out again in early February 1899. The insurrection was limited to a few 
areas in the scattered archipelago where the extreme geographical, social and 
ethnic divisions led U.S. imperialists to question the idea that the Tagalog and 
Ilocano forces led by Emilio Aguinaldo on Luzon constituted a ‘national’ 
movement. After his capture in 1901 and the fall of Miguel Malvar’s guerrillas in 
Batangas the following year, the war was, at least rhetorically, brought to an end 
in July 1902 with the presence of around 70,000 American troops and a 
ruthlessness which dismissed further insurrectional activity as banditry.
23
 
At the beginning of the uprising in 1899, Filipino revolutionary leaders 
tried to wage conventional warfare and were reluctant to resort to guerrilla 
strategies. On the one hand this restriction was nurtured by the hope for 
acceptance amongst the ‘civilized’ nations; on the other hand there was the elite’s 
fear of loosing control, both over  territory  and over the majority of their forces  
which might slip from an independence movement into social revolution. In the 
wake of the first defeats against the U.S. troops, Aguinaldo had to take these risks 
and organize local guerrilla units all over the country.
24
 As the war continued, 
U.S. officers and soldiers demanded a  tightening of military measures: Anti-
guerrilla strategies included not only the confiscation of property, summary 
executions,  massacres, deportations, and crop destruction, but also civilian 
concentration in designated areas. J. Franklin Bell’s concentration order on 8 
December 1901 for Batangas province illustrates how extreme measures in anti-
guerrilla warfare, targeting especially the civilian population, were gradually 
implemented.
25
 At the same time, in the ‘pacified’ towns and villages, American 
civil administrators tried to implement allegedly social ‘uplifting’ programs and 
economic development: new roads, schools, medical infrastructure, sanitation, 
13 
and ‘protection’ from the guerrilla forces. In Julian Go’s words, the occupying 
power’s efforts in social engineering predated ‘modernization theories of 
democratization later proposed in the 1950s’. Officers were convinced ‘that 
economic development stimulated by American capital would undo the putatively 
medieval social condition in the two colonies and stimulate sociopolitical 
development’. However, G. A. May has pointed to the early ‘hearts and minds’ 
campaign’s ‘relative failure’. Indeed, many civilians cooperated with the U.S. 
authorities during the day but at night they regularly served the guerrillas. 
Furthermore, the success of public instruction campaigns existed in many 
locations only on paper: schoolbooks were lacking in Batangas, school buildings 
were inadequate, and teachers unqualified – to name only a few of the many 
problems.
26
 
When Americans resorted to civilian concentration in the Philippines, 
officers were influenced not only by the contemporary  examples of the British in 
South Africa and the Spanish in Cuba but also by previous American experience 
of establishing ‘reservations’ for native Americans during the ‘Indian Wars’ in 
North America earlier in the 19
th
 century. In the ‘concentration zones’ in the 
Philippines tens of thousands of people died in the space of a few months from 
malnutrition and disease. In all our cases ‘the war of numbers’ has been politically 
exploited and the problem of statistics has challenged several generations of 
historians. Due to unreliable or fragmentary evidence it is doubtful if the precise 
number of deaths, as a result of civilian internment in each of our cases at the turn 
of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century, will ever be established. This is especially true for the 
Philippines, where it is difficult to separate deaths in the ‘concentration zones’ 
from the even greater number which followed as a result of epidemics of cholera 
and other diseases.
27
 
14 
In the light of the concentration-order for Batangas province and the 
accounts which followed of abuse and torture committed by U.S. troops, not only 
American anti-imperialists sensed a link between ‘butcher’ Weyler’s way of war- 
fare in Cuba and the methods being resorted to by the American forces in the 
Philippines. If the Spanish army’s similar anti-guerrilla strategy had brought 
about the recent American ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Cuba, was the U.S. 
army in the Philippines acting according to the laws of ‘civilized warfare’ recently 
embodied in the Hague Convention of 1899?
28
 Sustained by the idea of a 
‘civilizing mission’, American public opinion was persuaded that analogies were 
not necessarily parallels and took comfort from the contemporary British example 
in South Africa where extensive imperial experience and military necessity, it was 
argued, had justified their actions. In 1902 the Boston Journal argued that how 
civilian dislocation and internment were implemented determined ‘whether it is a 
harsh method or not’.29 
Moreover, the Filipinos were regarded as an ‘inferior race’, superstitious, 
fragmented, politically immature and incapable of self-rule. ‘Filipino 
independence’, declared Theodore Roosevelt, would be ‘like granting self-
government to an Apache reservation under some local chief’.30 Through policies 
of ‘chastisement’ and social engineering the Americans embarked on a ‘civilising 
mission’ in the Philippines to bring about a cultural transformation in which 
colonialism was claimed as a benevolent form of nation-building. Thus, both in 
Cuba and the Philippines, the occupying powers resorted to civilian concentration 
in order to defeat the insurgents and, as Emily Hobhouse put it in her book about 
the contemporary situation in South Africa, The Brunt of the War and Where it 
Fell (1902), it was the non-combatant civilians who suffered most. 
15 
SOUTH AFRICA (1900-1902): 
The concentration camps established by the British military in South 
Africa (1900-1902) have remained the most controversial and highly 
mythologised aspect of the South African War (1899-1902).
31
 Small wars are big 
wars to those that lose them and this war was more important than either the first 
or second world wars in the making of 20
th
 century South Africa and in firing the 
furnace of Afrikaner nationalism which blazed its way to political dominance in 
its aftermath. For Britain, this was the most extensive, costly and humiliating war 
fought between 1815 and 1914 and the greatest of the wars accompanying the 
European ‘scramble for Africa’. By March 1900, over 200,000 British and Empire 
troops (30,000 volunteers came from Canada, Australia and New Zealand) were 
fighting Boer forces numbering no more than 45,000. By 1902 this war was 
costing £1.5 million a week. What began as a colonial war, a Boer-British conflict 
over the Transvaal republic, soon developed into a regional war, with civil war 
dimensions to it, involving the whole population – black as well as white. This 
was not just a ‘white man’s war’ and historians have spent the past 30 years 
exploring the involvement of the black population in it. They have revealed how 
war went on at many different levels in South Africa between 1899 and 1902 
apart from the battlefields which have so preoccupied military historians. Many of 
the conflicts which then erupted into open warfare were home-grown, internally 
generated out of the recent South African past. The arrival of the British army 
enabled some of the conflicts endemic within South African society to become 
part of the Boer-British struggle.
32
 
The South African camps were first established by the British military as 
‘protection camps’ for Boers who had surrendered (Hendsoppers) and their 
families to prevent them being re-commandeered by Boers who were still fighting 
16 
on commando (Bitterenders). After the British annexed the two republics in mid-
1900, without effectively occupying them, this was a real danger. Soon, however, 
other refugees, mostly women and children (some of them the families of Boers 
who were still fighting) who had been displaced from their homes were forced to 
join them and already by late 1900 a blurring had occurred between ‘protection 
camps’ for surrendered Boers and ‘concentration camps’ for other civilian 
refugees. Many surrendered Boers initially supported the policy of concentrating 
the women and children in camps in their home districts, where they allegedly 
could be protected and fed by the British. Before the high mortality in the camps 
became generally known, some Boers still fighting on commando and unable to 
look after their families encouraged them to go there. The British hoped that the 
existence of the camps might bring a speedy end to the war since they announced 
that burghers on commando, who laid down their arms and took an oath of 
neutrality, could join their families in the camps, whereas they risked losing 
everything and having their farms confiscated or burnt if they continued to fight. 
‘They love their property more than they hate the British’, declared Milner, the 
British High Commissioner.
33
 Those caught on the battlefield were treated as 
prisoners-of-war and sent overseas to P.O.W. camps. The earliest refugee / 
concentration camps were already in existence by September 1900, but the 
number of their inmates was small until the beginning of 1901. Then, the harsh 
‘scorched earth’ and ‘clearance’ policy, initiated by Lord Roberts and 
systematically adopted and extended as an anti-guerrilla measure by Lord 
Kitchener (after he had succeeded Lord Roberts as the Commander-in Chief of 
the British army at the end of November 1900), swept tens of thousands of 
civilians – black and white – off the veld and into hastily improvised tented 
camps, established along the railway lines for military monitoring and supply 
17 
purposes, in an operation for which there had been no adequate planning. 
Assuming that the war would soon be brought to an end, these camps were 
expected to be a short-lived, temporary measure; but, as the guerrilla war dragged 
on, they became part of a much wider counter-guerrilla military strategy which 
included a guerrilla-catching network of thousands of blockhouses connected by 
barbed wire and manned by over 50,000 soldiers and African auxiliaries.
34
 
The South African camps reconsidered: 
The general picture of the British concentration camps in South Africa was 
established by Afrikaner nationalists in the decades after the war. They developed 
a powerful mythology of victimhood and suffering which fed into the emerging 
Afrikaner nationalist movement for which the deaths of 27,927 Boer civilians in 
these camps (the suspiciously precise figure calculated by the Transvaal archivist 
P.L.A. Goldman in 1906 by a suspect methodology) became a key reference point 
for the rest of the 20
th
 century.
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 After the political transition in South Africa in 
the 1990s, African nationalists re-worked these camps as sites of common African 
and Afrikaner victimhood and ‘shared suffering’ at the hands of British 
imperialists. What is extraordinary is not these efforts at quarrying the past for 
present purposes of nation-building – all nationalists do this – but the lack, until 
very recently, of any substantial, empirical and dispassionate research into these 
camps for which the surviving evidence is far richer, more detailed and extensive 
than that for any of the other cases of concentration camps considered here. Our 
recent research, in British and South African archives, has led to conclusions 
which are very revisionist of the established picture. 
The counter-guerrilla purpose of these camps during the protracted, 
guerrilla phase of the war (1900-1902) needs to be emphasized. These were not 
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‘punishment’ camps for a defeated enemy, as was the case for the Herero and 
Nama in German South West Africa (Namibia) during the war of 1904-1908. As 
Lord Roberts made clear, the Boer camp inmates were regarded as British 
subjects who were expected to become part of a self-governing, white minority-
ruled dominion within the British Empire. Although these were called 
‘concentration camps’, the terms ‘refugee camps’ and ‘burgher refugee camps’ 
were also used to denote what were essentially internment camps for civilians. 
These were clearly distinguished from the P.O.W. camps to which captured Boer 
combatants were dispatched, both in South Africa and overseas. A further 
distinction was made between the system of about 40 ‘white’ camps, established 
mainly in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony and administered by the 
Department of Burgher Refugees from headquarters in Pretoria and Bloemfontein, 
and the quite separate system of about 60 ‘black’ camps (‘native refugee camps’) 
which were organized by the Department of Native Refugees. These two systems 
of camps need to be considered separately since their differences are so marked. 
Understandably, it is the number of deaths in these camps which have 
preoccupied all who have written about them. The ‘white’ camps had about 
150,000 inmates, mostly women and children, along with a small number of their 
‘black’ domestic servants. Utilizing the surviving camp registers, death 
certificates and lists of camp deaths published in the Government Gazettes we 
have established a database of over 100,000 Boer camp inmates and estimate the 
total Boer camp deaths at around 25,000. This is less than Goldman’s figure but a 
good deal more than the official British total of 20,139. The thousands of deaths 
in the ‘black’ camps were omitted from the picture until B. Spies and P. Warwick 
established that there were 14,154 recorded deaths, a figure which is certainly an 
underestimate of the total deaths which occurred.
36
 In 2001, S.V. Kessler made an 
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estimate of 20,000 but too much of the evidence about the ‘black’ camps has been 
destroyed for the precise total to be known.
37
 Our research has led us to conclude 
that the total number of deaths in these camps for whites and blacks was at least 
40,000. 
The system of ‘white’ camps was administered from two headquarters, in 
Bloemfontein and Pretoria, with weekly statistical ‘returns’ and monthly reports 
from each camp along with reports from medical officers and inspectors most of 
which were forwarded to London and some of which were published in 
government Blue Books.
38
 This reflects the highly developed administrative 
systems of the British War Office and Colonial Office and the existence in South 
Africa of an effective civil government under the hawk-eyed British High 
Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner. It was he who, in April 1901, insisted that 
individual details of the deaths of Boer civilians in the ‘white’ camps be published 
weekly in the Government Gazettes. ‘We owe it to their relatives’, he said.39 As 
the mortality increased, reaching a peak in October 1901, these entries occupy 
many pages of these publications and, together with the revelations in the Blue 
Books, fuelled the public outcry. The paper trail left by the administrative system 
for these camps reveals not only facts and figures but also how these were queried 
and checked at each stage of their collection. 
It has long been known that the majority of these deaths (three quarters of 
them were of children under 16 years of age) were due to epidemics of measles 
and its accompanying complications. Measles is a highly infectious and deadly 
disease now, as then, especially amongst children in undeveloped countries, 
though the development of inoculation has greatly reduced its mortality record 
since the 1960s. What had been feared were typhoid epidemics. Typhoid also 
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occurred in some of the camps and caused the deaths of around 8,000 British 
soldiers in what the British army came to regard as ‘the last of the typhoid 
campaigns’; but there were only four recorded British deaths from measles.40 
Unlike the British troops, the Boers came from a thinly scattered, rural ‘frontier’ 
population which had little previous contact with measles and thus an extremely 
low immunity to the disease. Swept from their homes into hastily improvised, 
overcrowded, tented camps by the British army, with inadequate food, shelter, 
sanitation and medical supervision in the early months, they succumbed in 
epidemics which spread from camp to camp during 1901 – when extensive 
measles epidemics and mortality also occurred outside the camps for which we 
have no comparable record. The camp records reveal the desperate situation in 
many of the camps during the early months with some camp superintendents 
being described by visiting inspectors as ‘at their wits’ end trying to meet their 
responsibilities’ and begging the British forces not to send more people in to 
camps where there was a raging measles epidemic and where facilities were 
already stretched beyond their limit. Their pleas were usually ignored by a 
military only too ready to hand over responsibility for civilians to the civilian 
authorities. Contingents of several hundred Boer civilians, mostly women and 
children, were regularly ‘dropped off’, often without any advance notice, in a 
state of weakness and exhaustion after many days on the march. The mortality 
rates reached a peak of over 400 per 1,000 per annum for brief periods in some 
camps. 
These shocking mortality rates caused a public outcry in Britain when they 
were first revealed in mid-1901 by Emily Hobhouse, who had visited some of the 
camps. Her role is a striking example of the working of a free press in wartime 
and the 19
th
 century non-conformist conscience in action.
41
 The British 
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government was pushed into dispatching the first ever all women’s Commission 
of Enquiry to investigate the situation under the redoubtable leadership of 
Millicent Garrett Fawcett. The reforms which this Ladies Committee 
recommended were promptly enacted.
42
 The administration of the camps, having 
been transferred from military to civilian control, came under the sustained 
scrutiny of the Colonial Office and its officials rather than that of the otherwise 
preoccupied War Office. The accommodation, funding, food rations and 
sanitation in the camps were improved. Doctors, teachers and nurses were hastily 
recruited in Britain and dispatched to the camps. What Milner called some ‘Indian 
geniuses’ arrived in South Africa to bring Indian experience to bear on the 
administration of the camps in South Africa.
43
 The large influx of new camp 
inmates ceased. Historians have assumed that these developments, and especially 
what T. Pakenham called ‘the magical effect’ of the rapid implementation of the 
Fawcett committee’s recommendations, brought about the dramatic improvement 
in the camps and the fall in mortality by the end of 1901.
44
 Yet our research 
shows that incremental reforms in the camps were already underway, that the 
measles epidemics were already over, and mortality in many of the camps had 
markedly declined before these reforms came into effect. The epidemiological 
dynamics of measles (including epidemic ‘fade out’ with the end of large new 
influxes of susceptible people) need to be integrated into the analysis. 
A quite separate system of ‘black’ camps was organized by the Native 
Refugee Department under the leadership of the capable and well-intentioned 
Canadian, Captain de Lotbinière, whose reports form our most important source 
of information since most of such detailed data as was ever collected about 
individual ‘black’ camps was later destroyed. There were an even larger number 
of ‘black’ camps though many of these were short-lived holding centres.45 The 
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‘black’ camps in this war were ‘farm and labour’ camps in which African 
families, who had been displaced by ‘clearing’, were settled on unoccupied land 
close to the railway system guarded by British forces. There they were dumped 
and largely left to themselves to construct temporary huts or shanties. These 
‘black’ camps were regarded by the British as a labour reservoir from which men 
were dispersed for long periods all over South Africa to meet the huge labouring 
needs not only of the British army but of private employers as well. For this they 
were paid at the rate of a shilling a day. Meanwhile, the women and children – 
who, as in the ‘white’ camps, formed the bulk of the population in the ‘black’ 
camps – were expected to cultivate their own subsistence and sell any surplus. 
Some of the ‘black’ camps acted as satellites from which labour was drawn for 
menial tasks in the ‘white’ camps. Captain de Lotbinière was expected to keep 
start-up costs to a minimum and to move rapidly towards making the ‘black’ 
camps self-supporting. Certainly, they had far fewer staff and resources than the 
‘white’ camps and experienced some of the same epidemics, though disease-
specific data is largely absent. Particularly in relation to the expectation that these 
camps would cultivate their own subsistence and cost little, the ‘black’ camps are 
very different from the ‘white’ camps and would seem to have more in common 
with the concentration centres in Cuba. In the organization of concentration 
camps in South Africa, racial categorization played a crucial role. 
The ideas and ideology which the British brought to bear on the camps 
they established in South Africa were influenced by previous experience in 
Ireland (during the Famine in the 1840s) and India (where cholera and famine 
camps had been set up during the 1870s and 1880s) and by administering 
workhouses, the Poor Law and social welfare in England itself.
46
 Wherever 
possible, the important thing, as the camps administration put it, was ‘not to 
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pauperize the people’ and reduce them to dependence on hand-outs. Creating 
schools and employment – within or without the camps – was regarded as good 
for morale and would enable the inmates to ‘earn their rations’ and even to 
become self-supporting, be taken off the rations list and, in many such cases, to 
leave the camps. The South African camps were not prisons – many of them were 
not even fenced in until late in the war – and Brodrick (Secretary of State for 
War) made it clear that they were not penal and any of their inmates who could 
support themselves should be allowed to go to the towns.
47
 The camp registers 
reveal how many of the inmates moved about, in and out of the camps: to join 
relatives in other camps or to find employment and reside in nearby towns. But 
this was wartime, many had witnessed the destruction of their homes by the 
British army (30,000 farmhouses were burned down), permits were needed for 
travel, and most had nowhere else to go. 
The presence of Boer men of working age in the camps has been largely 
air-brushed out of the picture by Afrikaner nationalists who thought they should 
have been out fighting the British not living in camps and earning wages from 
them. So far, we have found over 13,000 and practically all of them were in some 
form of paid employment: either within the camps as guards, police, inspection 
teams, builders, carpenters, brick-makers, shoe-makers etc. or in the nearby 
towns. The camp registers also reveal the considerable number of Boer men in the 
camps who took the oath of allegiance and left the camps to take up active 
military service with the British in the Burgher Corps, formed for the purpose, 
where their pay was twice as much as they received in camp employment. Their 
importance to the British was as scouts and guides with an intimate knowledge of 
the terrain and the likely hideouts of the commandos amongst whom some of 
them had once lived. They were hated by the Boers still fighting and, if caught, 
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were court-martialled and shot. A. Grundlingh’s research reveals that about a 
quarter of the Boers still fighting at the end of this war, were fighting on the 
British side.
48
 Their wages could markedly improve the situation for their 
families. How do we know this? Because we have found records of the Transvaal 
camp shops, run by Poynton Brothers, some with takings of over £1,000 per 
month from camp inmates. Money was earned and spent in these camps on a scale 
that has been totally left out of the picture. The British camps in South Africa cost 
about £2.5 million to run. And what was the second highest item of expenditure – 
after food and camp supplies? The surprising answer is: wages to camp inmates. 
More was spent on this than on the total wage bill for the official camp staff. 
Wages were not only paid to the men but also to many of the young women who 
became probationer nurses in the camp hospitals, assisted in camp inspections, or 
taught in the camp schools – where, by the beginning of 1902, more Boer children 
were attending school than had ever been the case in the pre-war republics.
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 The 
opportunity the camps offered for social engineering and the acquisition of 
training and skills which would be of benefit to those who acquired them after the 
war was over, were all part of the imperial mind-set of the British in South Africa 
as in many later colonial situations.
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When a peace settlement was finally reached by the Treaty of Vereeniging 
on 31 May 1902, the British hoped that post-war policies of reconstruction, 
reconciliation and the move towards self-government (accelerated by the new 
Liberal government in Britain during 1906-1907) would result in a united, 
transformed, white minority-ruled South African dominion in which the British 
influence would prevail. Having won the war, they lost the peace to a mobilized 
Afrikaner nationalist movement which swept into power as soon as elections were 
held. The Union of South Africa, which came into being in 1910, was Boer-led 
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and Boer-dominated and skilfully achieved under the leadership of Botha and 
Smuts. The deaths of all those Boer civilians in British camps, especially of 
women and children, were unintended but they were deaths all the same; and they 
have cast a long shadow over Boer-British relations ever since. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
In all our cases, ideological concepts, the exclusion of the enemy from 
‘civilisation’ or blunt racial attitudes of superiority were used to justify  the 
intensification of warfare. The resort to civilian internment, involving a blurring 
of the fragile border between combatants and non-combatants, became 
acceptable. In a rapid process of racializing the ‘enemy’, U.S. soldiers 
increasingly envisaged the whole Filipino population as hostile and racial 
categorization thus played a key role in sanctioning extreme measures of warfare 
and in condoning high civilian losses.
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 In Cuba, civilian concentration was 
accompanied by the rural districts being declared as ‘free fire zones’: everybody 
outside the fortified towns was considered as an insurgent and treated as such. 
Inside the fortified towns neglect, incompetence, and lack of resources resulted in 
mortality on a scale that shocked the world and fuelled the American intervention. 
But in Spain, people were too preoccupied with the miserable health and supply 
situation of their own army overseas and the terrible state of its returnees from 
Cuba – skeleton-like men, shaken by tropical disease – to really care about the 
Cuban civilian population. Indignation about the Cuban situation reached Spain’s 
liberal opposition party through the American and liberal press and it used this to 
challenge the government. In the case of the Philippines, the high civilian death-
rate amongst the Filipino population and the atrocities committed by American 
forces during the anti-guerrilla war there aroused few demonstrations of public 
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concern in the United States apart from that of a few academics and the steadfast 
members of the Anti-Imperialist League. In Britain, by contrast, the press and 
public opinion were far more exercised about the situation in the South African 
camps than about the typhoid epidemics amongst British troops. The scale of 
mortality in those camps led the Liberal Party leader, Campbell-Bannerman, to 
accuse the government of fighting the war in South Africa by ‘methods of 
barbarism’ and did much to prick the bubble of jingoistic imperialism which had 
accompanied the war. 
At first sight, there might seem to be more differences between the camps 
examined in this article than aspects in common. Fortified and sometimes fenced 
towns in Cuba, with internees herded together in old warehouses, barracks, or 
improvised huts, had little in common with British tented camps, though many of 
the British camps for the wartime refugees who flocked to the towns, also began 
in already existing buildings. Concentrados in Cuba, like the inmates of the 
‘black’ camps in South Africa but unlike those in the ‘white’camps, were also 
expected to cultivate their own subsistence and serve as a labour reservoir, 
building fortifications for the Spanish and maintaining the island’s infrastructure, 
for which they were sometimes paid. Here, too, the idea behind these work 
schemes was to enable men to maintain their families although in practice they 
contributed little to defusing the critical humanitarian situation. Neither the Cuban 
nor the South African cases can be compared with the degree of forced labour in 
the German military’s camps in Namibia (1904-1908) which, in contrast with the 
three other cases examined here, were not established essentially as part of an 
anti-guerrilla strategy. They also differed in terms of organization and 
administration. Whereas, in South Africa, the British developed centralized camp 
administrations for both the ‘white’ and the ‘black’ camps, in Cuba local 
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committees (mayor, military commander, church, and local elite) were left to care 
independently for the destitute and compete for scant resources from the Captain-
General. A distinguishing feature in Cuba was the element of class-warfare 
inherent in civilian concentration where wealthy property-owners (who had paid 
their taxes and could afford volunteer forces to protect their estates) were 
excluded. In this respect, civilian concentration acknowledged and strengthened 
unequal property and land-owning structures by sweeping ‘unlawful residents’ 
away. In South Africa, after the war, the British re-instated the pre-war social 
order, assisted the Boer landowners to return to their farms, and did nothing to 
change the position of the African population. Just as the British in South Africa 
liked to refer to their ‘protection’ and ‘refugee’ camps, Spanish Generals also 
claimed in Cuba to ‘protect’ refugees from abuse and interference by the 
insurgents. Furthermore, it was argued that the rural population (‘savages’) would 
benefit from the ‘civilizing’ influences of concentration and urbanization. Ideas of 
social engineering were – as we have shown – much more explicit in South Africa 
and were well developed by the U.S. in the Philippines. But the rhetoric of the 
‘civilising’ or ‘modernizing mission’ should not blind us to the fact that, in all 
these cases, the rationale for the camps was essentially military. 
The military purpose of the camps, as a counter-guerrilla strategy in 
wartime – of separating insurgents from any support by civilian non-combatants – 
is the common denominator of the camps in Cuba, South Africa and the 
Philippines. As part of an anti-guerrilla strategy this was not new. The attempt to 
‘isolate’ the civilian population from insurgent guerrilla-fighters emerges as a 
characteristic feature of anti-guerrilla warfare. Referring to the well-known work 
of C. E. Callwell,
52
 the British military historian, I. Beckett, emphasizes that the 
resort to civilian concentration emerged ‘entirely independently in different 
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armies faced with the same kind of difficulties’.53 He makes a strong case for a 
structural understanding of anti-guerrilla policies. Recent research also indicates 
that in areas such as southern Africa, where British and German colonial powers 
were neighbours, they were ready, in a limited way, to assist each other during the 
first decade of the twentieth century at a time when there was a mounting 
antagonism between them in Europe.
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 Indeed, in Cuba, South Africa, the 
Philippines and Namibia, the different colonial powers were well informed about 
the ‘small wars’ of their contemporaries and could be said to have learned from 
each other’s counter-guerrilla measures, during the suppression of colonial 
rebellions, as well as from previous guerrilla wars. In some cases, individual 
soldiers drew on experience in several of these conflicts. Therefore, we would 
argue that the colonial development of concentration camps can be understood at 
best as a combination of structural factors and situational decisions that were 
influenced by both the personal experience of the decision makers and the 
example of other colonial powers. 
The colonial development of concentration camps, examined in this 
article, was part of a process which continued during the twentieth century with 
the later appearance of the ‘new villages’ in Malaya, the ‘camps de regroupement’ 
in Algeria, the camps during the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya, and the ‘strategic 
hamlet’ system in Vietnam. We would argue that none of these have much in 
common – either in purpose or in organisation – with the Nazi camps in Germany 
(from 1933) or in occupied Europe (1939-1945). Our goal is to point the way 
ahead for future work on the diverse phenomenon of forced civilian concentration 
which, in the twentieth century, was by no means limited to Europe or to 
European colonial arenas. 
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